Even a quarter century after its publication, however, Edith Sylla The problem with a proposition like 'What I am saying is false', is that we appear to be able to show not only that it is false, but that, in consequence, it is true as well. Brie y, if it were true that what I was saying was false, it would be false and so not true, hence (assuming it must be either true or false) it is false. But if what I was saying was false, then what I said was true, as well as false. If we think to avoid this contradiction by suggesting that what I said was neither true nor false, the revenge problem hits back through the alternative paradox: 'What I am saying is not true'. 7 The same reductio proof shows that it is not true. The problem for truth-value gap theorists is to explain why I did not speak truly when I anticipated them and said: 'What I am saying is not true'.
Bradwardine lays down from the start that every proposition is true or false. But he faces a similar problem. He can show that the paradoxical proposition, 'What I am saying is false', is false, by the standard reductio proof. How can he avoid what seems an inevitable consequence, that I must then have spoken truly when I said that it was false? Too often, purported solutions to the Liar (as we will see below) concentrate on proofs that it is true, or that it is false. But that is to avoid the real problem. We have a surfeit of proofs, both that it is true and that it is 190 stephen read
